its successful sailing trip between all 47 states, it will signifi cantly impact the Convention. It will newly bring a reference to the principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation to the Preamble of the Convention. Specifi cally, under Article 1 of the Protocol no. 15, a new recital shall be added to the Preamble, which shall read: "Affi rming that the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defi ned in this Convention and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation, subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights established by this Convention".
I will argue that this amendment of the Convention will require the European Court of Human Rights (hereinaft er "the Court") to enhance its work with the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. Namely, the article will invite the Court to develop a clear algorithm which may be used in upholding the new spirit of the Convention's Preamble. Firstly, I will defi ne what the margin of appreciation is and I will mention the mostly raised points of critique towards the doctrine. Secondly, I will briefl y identify the concepts of the margin of appreciation which appear in the Court's case-law. Th irdly, I will identify certain factors which impact the decision on use of a specifi c concept of the margin of appreciation. And fi nally, the relationship between identifi ed concepts and factors will allow me to construe a general algorithm of the margin of appreciation doctrine applicable in the decision-making of the Court.
Th e margin of appreciation doctrine and its critics
Over the years, many scholars and even the Court itself provided their defi nitions of what they thought the margin of appreciation was. Th e most-commonly referred to judgment in this regard is undoubtedly the Handyside case. 3 In the classic paragraphs no. 48 States' engagements (Article 19) (…) , is empowered to give the fi nal ruling on whether a "restriction" or "penalty" is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (…) . Th e domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision. " Th is judgment represents the core of the whole doctrine because it emphasizes the knowledge of Stras-bourg judges that they are in a worse position to decide on certain cases than domestic authorities. Th is position requires them to apply self-restraint, namely in deciding on what they consider to be necessary in democratic society, as the limitation clauses of Articles 8-11 of the Convention stipulate.
and 49 of this judgment, the Court noted: "By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements [of morals] as well as on the "necessity" of a "restriction" or "penalty" intended to meet them. (…) Nevertheless, Article 10 para. 2 (…) does not give the Contracting States an unlimited power of appreciation. Th e Court, which, with the Commission, is responsible for ensuring the observance of those
As far as academic defi nitions are concerned, I favor the words of the two last presidents of the Court. My understanding of the margin of appreciation doctrine is a little diff erent. I consider it important to incorporate the concepts of the margin of appreciation and external factors of the Court's decision-making which I will address in detail below. For that reason, I would defi ne the margin of appreciation as an ex post self-restraint of the Court, justifi ed by one of the external factors of the Court's decision-making, leading to deference of the Court to the state's judgment made within the framework of the aff orded free discretion, especially in the application of the Convention to particular facts of the case.
Th e doctrine of margin of appreciation has faced a very powerful criticism. 8 Lord Lester of Herne Hill even famously noted that "the concept of the "margin of appreciation" has become as slippery and elusive as an eel". 9 If we were to summarize the main objections against the use of the margin of appreciation, we may categorize them into several areas: e. Inability to create a uniform concept of human rights and a threat to the role of the Court in determination of an appropriate standard of human rights protection; 13 f. Eventual threat to the universality of human rights and creation of matrix for moral relativism -the doctrine allows for double standards which may undermine the credibility of the Court.
14 I share some of the critical points but I am predominantly a proponent of the margin of appreciation. Th e critical opinions towards the whole doctrine are usually based on the perception of international human rights protection as an opposite to a level of free discretion of states in this area. But I agree with John Merrils who points out that they are actually complementary. 15 In other words, where the discretion of states ends, there the international protection begins and vice versa. 16 Margin of appreciation may thus be regarded as a very useful instrument of vertical separation of powers between the Court and domestic authorities in the area of human rights protection.
Nonetheless, the calls for abolishing this doctrine became obsolete because of adoption of Protocol no. 15. However, the Court will now face a new challenge at the same time. It will have to refl ect on the valid points of critique and attempt to improve the way it works with the margin of appreciation which will most probably become a part of the Convention text.
Concepts of the margin of appreciation doctrine

a. Norm application and norm defi nition concepts of the margin of appreciation
Th ere are generally fi ve diff erent concepts of the margin of appreciation in the Court's case-law, depending on the perspective. Th e fi rst pair of concepts consists of norm application concept and norm interpretation concept. Margin of appreciation aff orded to the states in norm application means that the Court will apply self-restraint in respect of the domestic authorities' judgment on application of the Convention to a concrete set of facts of the case. In other words, the Court exercises deference to national authorities in evaluating whether concrete factual circumstances fi tted the defi nition of the Convention right or freedom. On the other hand, margin of appreciation aff orded to the states in norm defi nition means that the states have a room for maneuver in the very defi ning of a particular Convention right or freedom. Yuval Shany explains that the norm defi nition concept is related to international norms which are open-ended or unsettled. 22 He specifi es that they are commonly standard-type norms, discretionary norms or result-oriented norms. An example of the fi rst group may be the requirement of necessity in limitation clauses of Articles 8 -11 of the Convention. Th e second rule of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the Convention providing that no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law is a good example of a discretionary norm. And a typical result-oriented norm is the Article 6 of the Convention safeguarding the right to a fair trial. It does not specify how exactly are the states supposed to construe fair judicial systems, it only matters, in the end, if they really are fair as a whole in practice.
It is not easy to draw a line between these two concepts which may have been witnessed e. sexual couples. Th e majority used the norm defi nition concept of margin of appreciation and came to the conclusion that Austria did not have an obligation to adopt the relevant regulation of homosexual marriages before 2010. 24 But the dissenting judges noted that Austria relied on its margin of appreciation while failing to provide any argument justifying the diff erence in treatment of homosexual couples. In the opinion of the judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Jebens, Austria should not have been aff orded any latitude of discretion in the absence of such a justifi cation. Th ey thought that the margin of appreciation could be aff orded only if the state provided reasons for the interference with the applicants' rights under the Convention. It is thus clear that these judges would prefer the norm application concept of the margin of appreciation.
25
I am of the opinion, that the relationship between these two concepts requires clarifi cation. Th e most effi cient way of doing so would be to abandon the defi nition concept. I fully agree with the academic critique of this concept. It leads to the Court losing control over defi ning the exact contours of the rights in the Convention to an extent not justifi ed by the principle of subsidiarity.
26 George Letsas accurately describes the defi nition concept as related to the issue of limitability of Convention right. However, it does not provide an answer to a question if a particular interference is admissible or not. He therefore describes this concept as either "superfl uous or question begging".
27
It has to be stressed that the margin of appreciation is directly inter-connected with the principle of proportionality and it should be applied with regard to this inter-connection. But defi nition concept goes one step backwards to the very defi nition of Convention obligations where proportionality has no eff ect. In addition, it was mentioned in the Handyside judgment that: "Th e domestic margin of appreciation thus goes hand in hand with a European supervision".
28
Defi nition concept of the margin of appreciation doctrine runs against these principles and for that reason, it should be abolished. Some of the critical opinions mentioned above would accordingly lack substance, if the Court used the norm application concept only.
b. Wide, certain and narrow margin of appreciation
If we focus on the breadth of the margin of appreciation aff orded to the states when implementing their Convention obligations, there are three main concepts that the Court uses -wide, narrow and a "certain" margin of appreciation.
Th e wide margin of appreciation means that the Court applies self-restraint to the highest possible extent. Accordingly, the proportionality standard is low. If the margin of appreciation aff orded to the state is wide, then it is up to the applicant to submit arguments that the state nonetheless exceeded it. Th e most commonly used standard that the applicant's argumentation would have to reach is that the contested interference is "manifestly without reasonable foundation".
36
If the applicant succeeds in proving that the actions of state clearly lack reasonable grounds the Court will fi nd a violation of the Convention. In such a case, the state would overstep its margin of appreciation despite its wideness.
On the other hand, narrow margin of appreciation leads to a high standard of proportionality that the interference with Convention rights has to meet. Th e Court is deferent to domestic authorities' decision to the lowest possible extent. Th e states are practically deprived of their right to a certain degree of legitimate diff erences and the Court now adopts its role of a unifi er.
37 Th ere are also several areas where the narrow margin of appreciation typically appears: If the margin of appreciation aff orded to the state is narrow, then the burden of proof shift s from the applicant to the state. 43 It will be usually up to the Government Agent to show that the contested interference was justifi ed by "very weighty reasons" or "convincing and compelling reasons".
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Th e concepts of wide and narrow margin of appreciation are thus extremely important from the methodological point of view because they distribute the burden of proof between the parties to the proceedings before the Court and they set standards which the parties have to meet to make their case effi ciently.
Th e last concept that I would like to analyze in this part is that of a "certain" margin of appreciation. As far as the intensity of review is concerned, "certain" margin of appreciation is supposed to stand in the middle between the wide and narrow one. However, this concept does not allow us to fi nd out what the actual breadth of the margin of appreciation is. Th e standard of proportionality can also be no other than "certain". In addition, this concept is the most oft en used one -the statistics in HUDOC disclose that the Court uses "certain" margin of appreciation in almost a half of all cases where the margin of appreciation is invoked. In 2010, the Court used the margin of appreciation 134 times. Th e concept of a "certain" margin of appreciation was used in 66 of them (in 49, 3% cases). In 2011, the Court used the margin of appreciation 140 times. Th e concept of a "certain" margin of appreciation was used in 74 of them (in 52, 9% cases). In 2012, the Court used the margin of appreciation 166 times. Th e concept of a "certain" margin of appreciation was used in 77 of them (in 46, 4% cases). And in 2013, the Court used the margin of appreciation 181 times. Th e concept of a "certain" margin of appreciation was used in 73 of them (in 40, 3% cases). In average, the Court used the concept of a "certain" margin of appreciation in 47, 2% of all cases where it used the margin of appreciation doctrine in the last four years.
I have the same position towards the concept of a "certain" margin of appreciation as to the defi nition concept mentioned above. It is fundamentally fl awed and I believe that it is also a source of many of the critical opinions which point out the vagueness, ambiguousness and legal uncertainty that it creates. It does not allow for the distribution of burden of proof as the other two concepts do and blurs the choice of standards which ought to be met to make one's case, be it an applicant or the Government. Jan Kratochvíl made a fi tting analogy as he compared the margin of appreciation to a high jump. 46 If the margin of appreciation is wide, the bar for the state to jump over is pretty low. Narrow margin of appreciation means that the bar is much higher and makes it hard for the state to overcome it. But with the "certain" margin of appreciation, no one knows how high the bar is. Th erefore the state as a high jumper cannot even adapt the way it runs towards the bar. For these reasons, I would suggest that the Court ceases to use the concept of "certain" margin of appreciation.
To summarize, the Court should only work with the norm application concept of the margin of appreciation which leads to deference of the Court to the application of the Convention to a concrete factual background. Such margin of appreciation may be either wide or narrow which is vital for setting the relevant proportionality standard and distribution of the burden of proof between the applicant and the Court. Th ese conclusions will be methodologically crucial for the construction of the margin of appreciation algorithm below.
Factors impacting the decision on which concept of the margin of appreciation ought to be used
Having established the applicable concepts of the margin of appreciation, one certainly comes to a question: How do I fi nd out which of these concepts to use?
Andrew Legg provides an in-depth analysis of the so-called second order reasons which impact the decision on which concept of the margin of appreciation should be used. 47 Th ese second order reasons may be described as external factors of the Court's decision-making. Th ey are external because they don't necessarily deal directly with the very merits of the case, i.e. whether facts of the case indicate that a certain human right was violated or not. Th ese external factors rather provide systemic reasons for the Court's decision which lie outside the core of the merits of the case, and in particular, they infl uence the strictness of the Court's scrutiny. 48 In academic articles and the case-law of the Court, one may identify a high number of these factors. For reasons of economy, I will abstract them and catego-46 KRATOCHVÍL, supra note 8, s. 330. 47 LEGG, supra note 13, p. 17. 48 Ibid., rize them all in the table below.
49 Importance of the limited right to an individual, nature of the Convention obligation or existence of a common ground between European countries appear the most oft en. 50 But in the past decades, all the academics did not attempt to systemize these factors and analyze the relationships between them. I have come across the fi rst attempt to do so in the Czech commentary on the Convention where these factors are divided into general and special ones.
51 Th at is the fi rst starting point for us. Th e second starting point is the distinction that Andrew Legg made, because he identifi es three general second order factors leading to the application of the margin of appreciation doctrine. And within these three general factors, he identifi es those that widen the margin of appreciation and those which narrow it.
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To eff ectively summarize various factors impacting the decision on which concept of the margin of appreciation ought to be used, which were identifi ed by academic authors and the Court, we may put them all in the following 
Narrowing factors
In many cases, the narrowing and widening factors obviously confl ict. For example, in the Odièvre case mentioned above, one may identify the widening factor of the choice of legislature between two confl icting rights and a narrowing factor of importance of the limited right to an individual. In the seminal case of A, B and C, 53 the Court also faced a confl ict of several special factors. In arguing for the use of the narrow margin of appreciation, the applicants relied on the importance of the limited right, seriousness of the interference 54 and the practice of European states in their favor.
55 Th e third applicant added a factor of the rule of law because of an insuffi cient legal regulation of access to abortion.
56
In their attempt to persuade the Court to use the wide margin of appreciation, the Irish Government relied on the moral and ethical nature of the problem, the "Irish context" of the case and a lacking consensus on the issue of the beginning of life for the purposes of protection under Article 2 of the Convention.
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Resolving such confl icts is not an easy issue and the Court has never laid down any rules on how to do so. Jan Kratochvíl even believes that there are no such rules and that the confl icts have to be resolved on the basis of the particular factual background of a concrete case.
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But for the sake of transparency, non-arbitrariness and persuasiveness, I am of the opinion that such rules may be set. It must be borne in mind that the breadth of the margin of appreciation is inter-connected with the standard of proportionality. It is the other side of the same coin. Th erefore the confl ict of several factors may be resolved with the same methodology that we use to to fi nd the appropriate standard of proportionality -balancing.
Aft er all, Aharon Barak wrote that: "Balancing is central to life and law. It is central to the relationship between human rights and the public interest, or amongst human rights. Balancing refl ects the multi-faceted nature of the human being, of society generally, and of democracy in particular. "
59 Balancing exercise between the factors impacting the decision on which concept of the margin of appreciation should be used therefore seems to be perfectly fi t. 53 A, B and C, supra note 50. 54 Ibid., § 174. 55 Ibid., § 174-175. 56 Ibid., § 177-179. 57 Ibid., § 185. 58 KRATOCHVÍL, supra note 7, s. 91-92. 59 BARAK, Aharon. Proportionality. Constitutional Rights and Th eir Limitation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. p. 344. In practice, what one needs to conduct proper balancing, is a balancing formula. 60 Robert Alexy 61 probably came up with the most transparent one which may lead us to reviewable and persuasive conclusions. His balancing formula has three stages:
1. Establishing the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, a fi rst principle (a factor in our case) -the interference may be "light", "moderate" or "serious". 2. Establishing the importance of satisfying the competing principle (a factor in confl ict in our case) -likewise it may be "low", "medium" or "high". 3. Establishing whether the importance of satisfying the latter principle justifi es the detriment to or non-satisfaction of the former. More specifically, if the interference is light and the importance of competing principle is high, then the competing principle outweighs the fi rst principle. And even more specifi cally with respect to the topic of this part of the article, if a narrowing factor is limited seriously and importance of satisfying the widening factor is low, then the narrowing factor outweighs the widening factor.
Th ere are certainly other options how to resolve the confl ict between special factors (e.g. the so-called ex ante argument; quantitative solution where more factors of one kind outweigh the factors of another group; balancing formulas in dubio pro libertate or in dubio pro iustitia). But the Alexy's balancing formula is the most fi tting one because it may allow the Court to clearly explain why a certain concept of the margin of appreciation was chosen or not.
To sum up, we identifi ed several factors impacting the choice of the margin of appreciation concept. We categorized them into general ones and special ones. Th e special ones may have either a widening or narrowing nature. Th e confl icts between these two groups of factors may be resolved by using the balancing method. Namely, the Alexy's balancing formula may be used in order to fi nd out which concept of the margin of appreciation should be applied.
Construction of the algorithm
In the previous parts of the article we defi ned what the margin of appreciation was. We identifi ed its applicable concepts. And we came to the conclusion on how to choose a particular concept on the basis of relevant factors. But now, let us build on these conclusions and construe the margin of appreciation algorithm which could be applied by the Court in practice. Only full identifi cation of the relevant special factors will allow the Court to conduct proper balancing in the third stage of the whole algorithm.
Th e third phase is central to the outcome of applying the algorithm. Th is is where proportionality comes in as the other side of the margin of appreciation. It is the Court's task to carry out the balancing exercise. As I outlined above, the best instrument to balance the confl icting factors is the Alexy's balancing formula. Th e result of its application may be either the use of wide margin of appreciation or its narrow counterpart. Th e Court has to set out the reasons for its choice of the margin of appreciation concept clearly in order for the compliance with it to be tested later. Th e burden of proof will also be distributed depending on the conclusion of the Court in this stage of the test.
In the fi nal fourth step of the algorithm, the Court has to analyze if the breadth of the margin of appreciation aff orded to the state has or has not been exceeded by the state's interference. As I wrote earlier, if the margin of appreciation is wide, it will be up to the applicant's argumentation to prove that it is "manifestly without reasonable foundation". If, on the other hand, it is narrow, then the Government's justifi cation will have to satisfy the Court that its breadth was not overstepped by providing very weighty reasons for the interference. If either of them fails, the Court will rule against them. Namely, if the margin is wide and the applicant fails to prove that the contested interference lacks reasonable foundation, the limits of the state's discretion will be complied with and there will be no violation of the Convention found by the Court. Contrarily, if the margin is narrow and the Government fails to prove that it complied with its boundaries by submitting very weighty reasons for the interference, the Court will have to fi nd that the margin of appreciation was exceeded and the applicant's right violated.
Th at is what the general structure of the margin of appreciation algorithm may look like. It takes into account and gives appropriate emphasis to the various factors infl uencing the eventual breadth of the margin of appreciation which may be clearly, transparently and persuasively determined.
Conclusions
In conclusion, I would just like to provide a reader with a bigger picture and think outside the margin of appreciation algorithm box for a second. Th e margin of appreciation doctrine is still used the most in connection with Articles 8-11 of the Convention and their second paragraphs containing the limitation conditions. Th e Court usually uses a fi ve stage test mentioned above to fi nd if these provisions were violated by the state or not. One must ask -how do the margin of appreciation algorithm and the fi ve-stage test come together?
Once again we may refer to the relation of the margin of appreciation and proportionality. Th at comes into consideration in the fi nal stage of the fi ve-stage ICLR, 2014, Vol. 14, No. 1. test where the Court has to deal with necessity of the interference in the democratic society, provided that the case falls within the scope of one of the Convention articles, and there was an interference made in accordance with law pursuing a legitimate aim. If the Court gets to the fi nal fi ft h stage, then that is where it should be asking the fi rst question of the margin of appreciation algorithm. If it does not fi nd reasons to defer to the state on the basis of one of the general factors, it may proceed with an analysis of proportionality not aff ording any margin of appreciation to the state. It would be assessed whether the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and whether it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
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But if the Court fi nds reasons to aff ord the state with a degree of free discretion, it should follow the algorithm and take into account all the relevant factors which will point to the direction of wide or narrow margin of appreciation. Compliance with the breadth of the margin of appreciation may be subsequently verifi ed using the relevant standards.
Before the adoption of the Protocol no. 15, the Court faced a dilemma. It either had to acknowledge the critical voices and abolish the whole doctrine or it could enhance the way it is applied.
64 But now, abolishing the doctrine is no longer an option. Th e Court will now have to constructively address the criticism bearing in mind that consistency in decision making based on transparent rules is fundamental to any legal system.
65 Th e general margin of appreciation algorithm that I construed above may serve as a handy instrument for the Court to do so.
Th e application of the algorithm requires further study and research, indeed. For example, how may it be applied with regard to the positive obligations? And what about special areas of protection such as prohibition of discrimination, right to personal liberty, right to a fair trial or even the environmental rights? It is conceivable that these areas may require modifi cations to the general margin of appreciation algorithm.
Nevertheless, I believe that its form presented in this article may serve as a good starting point for such a research and mainly, for the Court to use the complex doctrine of margin of appreciation eff ectively, transparently and consistently. Th at would be the best answer to the strong criticism which the whole doctrine has faced in the recent years. 63 See e.g. Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1) 
